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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of con-
straints in the theory of relativity and, in particular, what philosophical work they
do for Einstein's views on the laws of physics. Einstein presents a view of local
structure laws which he characterizes as the most appropriate form of physical
laws. Einstein was committed to a view of science, which presents a synthesis be-
tween rational and empirical elements as its hallmark. If scientiﬁc constructs are
free inventions of the human mind, as Einstein, held, the question arises how such
rational constructs, including the symbolic formulation of the laws of physics, can
represent physical reality. Representation in turn raises the question of realism.
Einstein uses a number of constraints in the theory of relativity to show that by
imposing constraints on the rational elements a certain ﬁt between theory and
reality can be achieved. Fit is to be understood as satisfaction of constraint. His
emphasis on reference frames in the STR and more general coordinate systems
in the GTR, as well as his emphasis on the symmetries of the theory of relativity
suggests that Einstein's realism is akin to a certain form of structural realism.
His version of structural realism follows from the theory of relativity and is inde-
pendent of any current philosophical debates about structural realism.
Keywords: Einstein, covariance, invariance, laws of nature, laws of physics, realism,
relativity, structural realism, symmetries
1 Introduction
The great power possessed by the general principle of relativity lies in
the comprehensive limitation which is imposed on the laws of nature
(...) (Einstein 1920, p. 99).
Physics is the description and explanation of the kinematic and dynamic behavior
of physical systems. Einstein agreed with this characterization when he wrote:
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Physics is the attempt at the conceptual construction of a model of the real
world, as well as its lawful structure (quoted in Fine 1986, p. 97; italics in original;
Einstein 1948, p. 321). In his writings, Einstein often speaks of the laws of nature.
When he does so, it is always in connection with the way the laws of nature are
symbolically formulated in physics. In accordance with philosophical custom
we should distinguish between the laws of nature and the laws of physics. The
laws of nature are the regularities, which exist in nature, irrespective of human
awareness. The laws of physics are symbolic expressions of the laws of nature
(Einstein 1949a, p. 68; Weinert 1993; Weinert 1995). In Einstein's understanding
the laws of physics refer to the laws of nature. This basic distinction between
the lawful regularities, which exist in nature, and their symbolic formulations
in the language of mathematics, reﬂects Einstein's realist attitude of his later
years. Einstein was a realist in the sense that he believed in the existence of an
external world (Einstein 1922, p. 2; Einstein 1948, p. 321; Einstein/Infeld 1938,
p. 296; Einstein 1949a, p. 81). This external world consists of objectively given
objects and ﬁelds and their lawlike regularities (Einstein 1948,  2). Einstein
also says that physics deals with space-time events (Einstein 1949b, p. 6). But
he also believed that scientiﬁc theories, including the laws of physics, were at all
times subject to possible modiﬁcations. The empirical world provides the raw
material, the rational mind imposes a structure on the empirical material. Not
any structure will do, for the empirical world will resist the imposition of order
that does not ﬁt. How is this ﬁt to be achieved? How can physics capture the
lawful structure in nature? In a nutshell, Einstein's answer is: For the laws of
physics to be expressions of the lawful regularities in nature, they have to satisfy
certain constraints. These constraints must be imposed on the laws of physics,
as the symbolic expressions of the laws of nature. The constraints are needed
to ensure an acceptable degree of ﬁt between the laws of physics and the laws
of nature. The connection between scientiﬁc constraints and Einstein's views on
physical theories and laws has not been explored in the literature. The purpose of
this paper is to highlight this connection between physics and philosophy. In this
process it will be possible to construct an account of the laws of physics out of
the toolkit of Einstein's physics. To spell out this connection, we have to consider
(a) Einstein's employment of constraints in the theory of relativity (Sections 2
and 3); (b) Einstein's view on structure laws, which lead to a structural view of
laws (Subsection 4); (c) Einstein's version of realism (Section 5).
2 Physical Constraints
2.1 Einstein's Constraints
In his work Einstein appeals to a number of constraints. Constraints can be
understood as restrictive conditions, which symbolic constructs must satisfy in
order to qualify as admissible scientiﬁc statements about the natural world. If
theories are free inventions of the human mind, as Einstein insists, there is a
need for constraints to make them relevant to the external world. A methodolog-
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ical constraint is the appeal to logical simplicity and uniﬁcation in the choice
of scientiﬁc theories. An empirical constraint is the demand that a scientiﬁc
statement must conform to well-conﬁrmed facts about the physical world. The
empirical facts comprise Einstein's famous predictions: the redshift of light as
a function of gravitational ﬁeld strengths and the bending of light rays in the
vicinity of strong gravitational ﬁelds. He also explains the perihelion advance of
Mercury and other planets. A theoretical constraint is the demand that a scien-
tiﬁc statement must be compatible with well-established mathematical theorems
and physical principles. Einstein introduces relativity, symmetry and covariance
principles as theoretical constraints. For a discussion of Einstein's views on the
laws of physics, the methodological constraints are less important than the con-
straints associated with the theory of relativity. The insistence on constraints,
which the physical laws must satisfy, is due to the enhanced importance of inertial
frames in the Special theory of relativity. Inertial frames can be understood as
idealized systems, which in the Special theory of relativity are constructed from
measuring rods and synchronized clocks. Many physical properties, which were
erstwhile regarded as absolute, become perspectival in this theory. Perspectival
means that particular values of parameters can only be determined by taking
the coordinate values of individual inertial frames into account. These coordi-
nate values are read oﬀ synchronized clocks and rigid rods. These elements are
allowed to vary from inertial frame to inertial frame. They lead, as we shall see,
to a perspectival notion of reality. The prime examples are temporal and spatial
measurements. These result in diﬀerent coordinate systems, which describe the
motion of the reference frames through space-time. The inertial frames are also
related through the Lorentz transformation rules, which leave certain elements
invariant. The prime example is the velocity of light. Also the general laws, on
which the ediﬁce of theoretical physics is based, claim to be valid for every nat-
ural event (Einstein 1918b, p. 109). We have, on the one hand, a large number
of frames, between which only some properties remain invariant. On the other
hand, the general laws of physics claim validity for every inertial and non-inertial
system. To satisfy these demands, constraints come to hand. As the theory of
relativity developed, Einstein imposed three constraints on the laws of physics;
ﬁrst relativity and symmetry principles, later his covariance principles.
2.2 Relativity Principles
In his famous 1905 paper Einstein used an explanatory asymmetry in classical
accounts of induced currents to motivate his relativity principle. He complained
that the then current view oﬀered two diﬀerent explanations for an observation-
ally indistinguishable phenomenon. If a conductor is in motion with respect to a
magnet at rest (in the ether), the electrons in the conductor experience a Lorentz
force, which pushes them around the conductor, inducing a current. If the magnet
is in motion with respect to the conductor at rest, the Lorentz force is no longer
the cause of the current, for no Lorentz force applies to charges at rest. The
time-dependent magnetic ﬁeld now produces an electric ﬁeld inside and outside
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the conductor, resulting in the same current. To avoid this kind of asymmetry of
explanation  an asymmetry not present in the phenomena  Einstein required the
physical equivalence of all inertial frames and the Lorentz invariance of Maxwell's
equations. No inertial frame must serve as a preferred basis for the description of
natural events. For this reason Einstein abandoned Newton's absolute space and
time and 19th century ether theories. Later he found that even his Special the-
ory (STR) conferred an unjustiﬁable preference on inertial frames and Euclidean
geometry. The General theory (GTR) extends the principle of relativity to all 
inertial and non-inertial  systems. In its general form the principle states that
all frames must be equivalent from the physical point of view. This extension is
required if the theory of relativity is to include accelerated frames.
Generally, relativity principles stipulate the physical equivalence of frames or
the indistinguishability of their state of motion. In particular, Einstein referred
equivalence to the laws of motion. The laws which govern the changes that happen
to physical systems in motion with respect to each other are independent of the
particular system, to which these changes are referred (Einstein 1905,  I.2). In
the General theory, the inertial frame no longer plays any particular part, having
been replaced by general coordinate systems. The general principle of relativity
reads: All Gaussian co-ordinates are essentially equivalent for the formulation of
the general laws of nature (Einstein 1920, pp. 9798; Einstein/Grossmann 1914,
p. 216; Friedman 1983, Ch. IV.5; Earman 1974, p. 273).
As was pointed out, an inertial frame can be understood as an idealized system,
in which only certain parameters are of interest, in particular parameters, which
concern the state of motion of the system. In his 1905 paper Einstein deﬁned
inertial frames by a network of measuring rods and synchronized clocks. Within
a particular inertial frame they are all at rest with respect to each other. To
construct an inertial frame  a mechanical scaﬀold (Einstein/Infeld 1938, p. 156)
 we need a system of ﬁnite rigid rods to indicate the three spatial dimensions.
We then attach a number of synchronized clocks to the rods of the scaﬀold.
According to the Special theory of relativity, the clocks and rods will behave in
distinct ways, depending on the state of motion of the frame. Rods will undergo
length contraction and clocks will register time dilation eﬀects in a frame that
moves at high speed with respect to a stationary frame. This relativistic behavior
of the clocks and rods will give us the spatial and temporal coordinates of a
particular inertial frame (at rest or in motion).
In the GTR inertial frames are replaced by general coordinate systems because
this theory is based on non-Euclidean geometry and accepts the non-uniform
motion of the frames. Einstein illustrates the assignment of coordinates with a
rotating disc thought experiment. We want to measure the ratio of circumference
to diameter, C/D, on two discs, which are arranged in such a way that one disc
is at rest and the other rotates uniformly with respect to it. In a Euclidean world
we would predict that C/D = pi on both discs. But relativity demands that we
introduce two frames. In the system at rest, K, C/D = pi. But measured from
this system, K, the ratio in the rotating system, K', will measure C/D > pi. This
inequality is due to the length contraction of the tangential rods placed along the
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circumference of K'. There is therefore a need for more general coordinate systems
to discuss the behavior of clocks and rods in accelerated systems or gravitational
ﬁelds. Because the rigid measuring rods and synchronized clocks can no longer
be used in gravitational ﬁelds, arbitrary coordinate systems take the place of the
inertial frames of the STR (Norton 1993, p. 836). Coordinate systems can be
characterized as the smooth, invertible assignment of four numbers to events in
space-time neighborhoods (Norton 1993,  6.3; Earman 1974, p. 270; Landau/
Lifschitz 1975, p. 230; Lyre 2004, pp. 131132; Stachel 1989, p. 65, p. 86). The use
of more general coordinate systems will play a role in considerations of covariance.
In a letter to Ehrenfest, dated December 26, 1915, Einstein declares that the
inertial frame signiﬁes nothing real (quoted in Stachel 1989, pp. 8687). As in
the STR the inertial frames were used to take temporal and spatial measurements,
Einstein concluded that in the GTR space and time had lost the last vestiges of
reality (Einstein 1916,  3; Einstein 1949a, p. 67).
2.3 Invariance and Symmetries
Whether we consider inertial frames or arbitrary coordinate systems, there must
be transformation rules between them. In the STR the transformation rules are
expressed in the Poincaré group; in the GTR there are more general transforma-
tion groups, which no longer favor inertial frames. As they allow only dynamic
objects, Einstein's desire to move beyond Minkowski space-time, with its ﬁxed
pseudo-Euclidean background, is satisﬁed. Every gravitational ﬁeld represents a
change of the spatio-temporal metric, which is determined by the functions gik.
These functions determine the metric properties in curved coordinate systems.
Einstein was one of the ﬁrst physicists to appreciate the importance of symmetry
principles in physics.
The symmetry principles of the relativity theory are related to invariance. Com-
pared with the many types of symmetries, which are recognized today (global,
local, external, internal, continuous and discrete symmetries, see Castellini 2003,
Ch. 26.6; Kosso 2000; Martin 2003), Einstein only deals with space-time symme-
tries of a global (STR) or local (GTR) kind. The Lorentz transformations are
global transformations: they are constant throughout space and time.
The Lorentz rules show how to transform coordinates x and t into x' and t'.
However, in Minkowski space-time, the space-time interval, ds2 , remains the
same in transitions between two inertial frames and is expressed by the invariant
line element:
ds2 = c2dt2 − dx2 − dy2 − dz2 . (1)
Equation (1) captures Einstein's desire to call his theory theory of invariants
rather than relativity theory. The point about symmetries is that in a transi-
tion between inertial frames they return certain invariant parameters. But clock
readings change between inertial frames in constant motion with respect to each
other.
What about the laws of nature? If the laws of nature are to be the same in all co-
ordinate systems, they must govern the invariants of the transformation groups.
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That is, the laws of physics must express the invariant features as coordinate
systems undergo space-time transformations. Einstein explicitly claims that the
laws of physics are statements about space-time coincidences. In fact only such
statements can claim physical existence (Einstein 1918a, p. 241; Einstein 1920,
p. 95). As a material point moves through space-time its trajectory is marked
by a large number of co-ordinate values x1, x2, x3, x4. It can equally well be
described in terms of x′1, x′2, x′3, x′4. This is true of any material point in motion.
It is only where the space-time coordinates of the frames coincide that they have
a particular system of coordinate values x1, x2, x3, x4 in common (Einstein 1916,
p. 86; Einstein 1920, p. 95). In terms of observers, attached to diﬀerent coordinate
systems, it is at such points of intersection that they can agree on the temporal
and spatial measurements. This is Einstein's point-coincidence argument. As
we shall see, Einstein regards the equivalence of diﬀerent coordinate systems 
dx, dx′  as an argument for general covariance (Einstein 1916,  3; see Norton
1993,  3.5; Stachel 1989, p. 87). From this argument, many physicists, includ-
ing Einstein, concluded as a philosophical consequence of the symmetries of the
relativity theory that only the invariant can be regarded as the physically real.
This may be dubbed the invariance view of reality (Weinert 2004b, Ch. 2.8).
2.4 Perspectival Reality
Is it true that only the invariant is real? What happens, say in the STR, to the
clock and meter readings in particular inertial frames? Should we conclude that
these events are unreal in the respective inertial frames? This would be unwise
because the situation does not depend on perceptual relativity. Diﬀerent systems
in motion with respect to each other measure diﬀerent values for rod lengths and
clock times. These measurements do not depend on what observers perceive.
Rather for the observers in the respective systems, these measurements have
perspectival reality. Observers in time-like related frames, moving at a constant
velocity with respect to each other, can observe that their clocks ticks at diﬀerent
rates and their measuring rods do not measure the same lengths. The ticking rate
of the clocks and the behavior of measuring rods show that perspectivalism is not
observer-dependent but frame-dependent. It depends on the behavior of rods and
clocks in particular frames. For instance, in the famous Maryland experiment
(197576), atomic clocks were put on 15-hour-ﬂights. When they were compared
to earth-bound, synchronized clocks, it was found that the air-born clocks had
experienced time dilation  they had slowed down by 53ns. The perspectival
realities of physics are the result of a combination of frame-dependent and frame-
independent parameters of inertial frames. For the diﬀerent inertial frames are
held together by four-dimensional Minkowski space-time.
If we adopt perspectival realities, what becomes of the physicist's criterion that
only the invariant is to be regarded as real? The adoption of perspectival, frame-
dependent realities does not contradict the invariance criterion of reality. The
Minkowski space-time structure has both invariant and perspectival aspects. In
Minkowski space-time, the non-tilting light cones, emanating from every space-
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time event, are invariant for every observer. The space-time interval, ds, is
invariant across inertially moving frames. The particular perspectives then result
from attaching clocks and rods to the scaﬀolds. That is, they result from the
particular slicing of space-time by the world lines of inertial systems in relative,
constant motions with respect to each other. The symmetries tell us what remains
invariant across inertial frames, and what is variable. Once we know that the laws
remain invariant across diﬀerent inertial frames, we can derive the perspectival
aspects, which attach to diﬀerent inertial frames, as a function of velocity. Such
a modiﬁed view of physical reality can be derived from the Minkowski presenta-
tion of the theory of relativity. Max Born compared the perspectival realities to
projections, which must be connected by transformation rules to determine what
remains invariant. The projections are reﬂections of frame-dependent properties.
But there are also frame-independent properties, which are invariant in a number
of equivalent systems of reference.
In every physical theory there is a rule which connects projections
of the same object on diﬀerent systems of reference, called a law of
transformation, and all these transformations have the property of
forming a group, i.e. the sequence of two consecutive transformations
is a transformation of the same kind. Invariants are quantities having
the same value for any system of reference, hence they are independent
of the transformations (Born 1953, p. 144).
The Lorentz transformations show, Born adds, that perspectival quantities like
distances in rigid systems, time intervals shown by clocks in diﬀerent positions,
masses of bodies, are now found to be projections, components of invariant quan-
tities not directly accessible (Born 1953, p. 144). We can therefore see that
perspectivalism and invariance are two faces of symmetries (Weinert 2004a).
2.5 Active and Passive Transformations
The relativity principles state that all inertial and non-inertial frames are to be
treated as equivalent from a physical point of view. The invariance principle
states that symmetry transformations performed on inertial frames must return
some values of parameters as invariant. But how can we make sure, asks Weyl,
that the laws of nature remain invariant with respect to arbitrary coordinate
transformations? (Weyl 1924, p. 197). To see the need for a further constraint,
at which Weyl hints, consider the distinction between active and passive trans-
formations. The active interpretation of the transformation rules means that the
inertial frames themselves experience a physical change  a translation or rota-
tion, which leaves certain invariants. The passive interpretation means that we
keep the physical system ﬁxed and merely change the coordinate system, from
which the system is described. Intuitively, we would agree that a mere change of
coordinates will not aﬀect the lawful regularities, which govern the behavior of the
system. The laws must retain their form whether they are considered from dif-
ferent coordinate systems or described in diﬀerent mathematical languages. This
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intuition reﬂects Einstein's demand that the laws of physics remain covariant
with respect to diﬀerent coordinate systems of the theory of relativity.
3 Mathematical Constraints
3.1 Covariance
Covariance is prima facie a mathematical constraint. The modern use is quite
diﬀerent from the way Einstein uses the notion of covariance. Einstein associates
covariance with the transformation rules of the theory of relativity.
He imposes on the laws of physics the condition that they must be covariant (a)
with respect to the Lorentz transformations (Lorentz covariance in the Special
theory of relativity; Einstein 1949b, p. 8; Einstein 1950b, p. 346) and (b) to gen-
eral transformations of the coordinate systems (general covariance in the General
theory; Einstein 1920, pp. 5463; Einstein 1950b, p. 347). The theory of relativ-
ity will only permit laws of physics, which will remain covariant with respect to
these coordinate transformations (Einstein 1930, pp. 145146). This means that
the laws must retain their form (Gestalt) for coordinate systems of any kind
of states of motion (Einstein 1940, p. 922). They must be formulated in such a
manner that their expressions are equivalent in coordinate systems of any state
of motion (Einstein 1916; Einstein 1920, pp. 4243, 153; Einstein 1922, pp. 89;
Einstein 1940, p. 922; Einstein 1949a, p. 69). A change from coordinate system,
K, to coordinate system, K', by permissible transformations, must not change
the form of the physical laws. This leads to the characterization of covariance as
form invariance.
Einstein often illustrates covariance with respect to the space-time interval ds2
(Einstein 1922, p. 28, p. 61), e.g. the form invariance of the expression
ds2 = ds′2 . (2)
Expression 2 remains form-invariant under a substitution of coordinate system,
K, into another quasi-Euclidean coordinate system, K', as indicated by the coor-
dinates dx, dx′ etc. An essential insight of the General theory was that Minkowski
space-time still remains quasi-Euclidean, since it does not take into account the
presence of gravitational ﬁelds. The equivalence principle allowed Einstein to
make the step to a general principle of relativity. When gravitational ﬁelds are
introduced, the space-time interval, ds2, assumes the more general form
ds2 = gikdx
idxk = 0 , (3)
where the g ik are functions of the spatial coordinates x1, x2, x3 and the temporal
coordinate x0.
It is now this more general relation, which must remain covariant with respect to
arbitrary continuous transformations of the coordinates (Einstein 1950b, p. 350;
Einstein 1920, p. 154). It is however possible to recover Eq. (1). In an inertial
system with spatial Cartesian coordinates x1,2,3 = x, y, z and temporal coordinate
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x0 = ct, the functions gik become g00 = −1, g11 = g22 = g33 = +1 and gik = 0 for
i 6= k.
Einstein takes the equivalence of all coordinate systems as a reason to require
a general covariance principle for the formulation of the laws of nature. Here
equivalence does not mean physical equivalence of frames but equivalence of the-
oretical expressions. For we have seen that the laws must retain their form if we
substitute the space-time variables of K for those of K'. But if in K the speed of
light is c, and K is transformed into K' such that the value of c is not returned,
then the law has not retained its form. The general laws of nature are to be
expressed by equations, which hold good for all systems of coordinates, that is,
are covariant with respect to any substitutions whatsoever (generally covariant;
Einstein 1916, p. 83; quoted in Stachel 1989, p. 87; see also Einstein 1930, p. 146;
Einstein/Grossmann 1914, pp. 215256).
The criterion of substitution serves as a more general characterization of co-
variance; it applies also to models of space-time theories. Such models can be
represented in the general form 〈M,Oi〉, where M represents the diﬀerentiable
manifold of space-time points (the topology of space-time in local neighborhoods)
and the O i 's represent various geometric objects, like the spatio-temporal met-
rics, which diﬀer between STR and GTR.
Deﬁnition 1 The laws of a theory T are covariant for a set of coordinate systems
CS, if and only if for any particular coordinate system cs (cs ∈ CS) and any
particular dynamic model m = (M, O1, O2 . . .On), which is a member of the set
of dynamically possible models MDT , the laws of T hold when the cs-coordinate
components of the geometric object ﬁeld Oi' (on the manifold M) are substituted
into these laws.1
Under the substitution criterion the laws retain the same form in all particular
coordinate systems, cs, in the set CS. The substitution criterion explains why
covariance has often been thought of as empty of physical content (Weinberg
1972, p. 92; Kretschmann 1917). It seems to be merely a mathematical operation.
Einstein however insisted, as we shall see below, that covariance had heuristic
value. We can shed some further light on this question by asking, What does
form invariance mean? Recall that Einstein regards the equivalence of diﬀerent
coordinate systems  dx, dx′  as an argument for general covariance. If we look
at the various expressions used in the examples, we see that they do not retain
their symbolic forms. They may not even retain their syntactic form as we can
transform from Cartesian to polar coordinates. The following idea suggests itself:
covariance expresses the requirement that diﬀerent symbolic expressions of the
laws of nature express the same propositional content. The propositional content
expresses an objective fact about the real world, which remains unaﬀected by
the choice of diﬀerent symbolic formulations (the linguistic expressions Morning
Star and Evening Star share the same referent: the celestial object Venus).
1 Adapted from Deﬁnition 3 of Earman (1974), p. 278; see also Friedman (1983), p. 51;
Norton (1989), p. 1241; Lyre (2004), pp. 129132.
Physics and Philosophy  2007  Id: 007 9
Friedel Weinert: Einstein and the Laws of Physics
A change in symbolic form should not change the objective relations, which the
laws express. Form invariance therefore means that the space-time relations,
expressed in diﬀerent theoretical expressions, remain objective, i.e. they retain
their propositional content (see Kosso 2003; Scheibe 1981; Scheibe 1991; Earman
1974, p. 287). As Einstein often stressed we are free to choose our symbolic
expressions or coordinate systems, whether they are physical theories, laws or
axioms of geometry.
If covariant equations share the same referent so that they remain equivalent
under the criterion of substitution, what can we say about the referent of the
laws of physics? Einstein's notion of structure laws will help us clarify this issue.
But let us ﬁrst consider some complications.
3.2 Complications
Einstein himself was not always clear about the precise status of the covariance
principle. Confusingly, Einstein associates general covariance both with invari-
ance under non-linear transformations and the general principle of relativity. For
instance, he characterizes the principle of relativity as a covariance principle: the
laws of nature are statements about space-time coincidences; they ﬁnd their nat-
ural expression only in covariant equations (Einstein 1918a, p. 241).2. When he
turns to the General theory he considers that from a formal point of view the
admission of non-linear coordinate transformations is a mighty enlargement of
the idea of invariance, i.e. the principle of relativity (Einstein 1949b, p. 10; see
also Einstein 1920, pp. 9798; Einstein 1922, p. 60).3
In these formulations Einstein runs together several constraints on laws, which
more recent scholarship has kept apart (Norton 1989; Norton 1992; Norton 1993;
Norton 2003; Friedman 1983; Scheibe 1981; Scheibe 1991; Stachel 1989; Stachel
1993). Einstein thought of relativity principles as requiring the physical equiv-
alence of all frames. Wigner described the Lorentz transformations as geomet-
ric symmetry transformations, which carry one inertial frame into another. A
Lorentz transformation of a inertial frame K into K' returns some invariant
properties. In Minkowski four-dimensional space-time the Lorentz transforma-
tions become rotations of the coordinate axes, from t to t′ and from x to x′
through some angle, α. The tangent of α indicates the speed of the x′-t′-system
with respect to the x-t-system. But if covariance is understood as form invari-
ance, then it should be distinguished from both relativity principles and symmetry
invariance.
2On can see why Einstein is tempted to treat the general relativity principle as a covariance
principle: where space-time events coincide, the coordinate values coincide too, so the substi-
tution from K to K' is covariant. The covariant expressions are equivalent, just as the frames
K and K ′ are treated as physically equivalent (see Norton 1992, p. 298).
3 One can see why Einstein is tempted to associate transformations with (form) invariance:
the substitution under arbitrary transformations does not change the form of the law; and
according to the principle of relativity inertial frames are equivalent from a physical point of
view; across these frames the laws are invariant, but this is symmetry invariance, not form
invariance.
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(A) Although Einstein treated the covariance principle as an extension of the
general relativity principle, it does not guarantee the relativity of all kinds of
motion. The sameness of form is too weak to guarantee physical equivalence
of systems in motion. (Friedman 1983, p. 206208; Landau/Lifschitz 1975,  82;
Dieks 2006, p. 183, p. 186). Covariant formulations of space-time theories may
retain privileged inertial frames. Newtonian mechanics can be reformulated in
terms of neo-Newtonian space-time theory; its symmetry group is the Galilei
group. In neo-Newtonian space-time the notion of absolute space has become
superﬂuous but it still requires the notion of absolute time, absolute simultaneity
planes and Euclidean inertial frames. Covariant formulations of the STR aban-
don the notion of absolute time but retain relative quasi-Euclidean simultaneity
planes. As Einstein recognized, the STR still displays a preference for inertial ref-
erence frames. Space-time itself is a rigid background, which acts on the inertial
systems but nothing acts on the structure of space-time.
(B) Covariance is not a symmetry principle in the sense of the Lorentz transfor-
mations, which transform the reference system under consideration, while retain-
ing some invariant parameters. It is true that covariance produces form invariance
and therefore equivalence between theoretical expressions. But it is symmetry
of the mathematical formulations, a redescription, not a transformation of the
inertial frames (as idealized systems) under space-time transformations. Covari-
ant formulations of space-time theories exist, which admit of diﬀerent degrees
of invariance. Consider, for instance, geometric formulations of Newtonian and
neo-Newtonian space-time, respectively:〈
R3, t, h, A,∇〉 (4)
(R3 is the Euclidean manifold, t and h stand for temporal and spatial metrics, A
deﬁnes the special reference frame of absolute space and ∇ deﬁnes the aﬃne con-
nection); in neo-Newtonian space-time absolute space is shown to be superﬂuous
because of the Galilean relativity principle:〈
R3, t, h,∇〉 . (5)
In Newtonian space-time it is possible to deﬁne sameness of place at diﬀerent
times, indicating the postulation of absolute space; this is no longer possible in
neo-Newtonian space-time. Formulations (4) and (5) are covariant, but in (5) the
invariance of place at diﬀerent times is lost (see also Earman 1974, pp. 276277;
Norton 1993,  5.4; Scheibe 1981, pp. 457458).
To distinguish form invariance (covariance) from symmetry invariance we could
just say that it is the diﬀerence between a formal (passive transformation) and
a physical aspect (active transformation; Norton 1993,  2.3,  6). But there is
more to covariance than the demand for the equivalence of theoretical expressions.
The expressions must be objective: they must have the same referent. This
complicates matters, since covariance, introduced as a mathematical constraint,
acquires physical signiﬁcance in an indirect way (Lyre 2004, pp. 131132; Norton
1989,  4.3; Norton 2003; Norton 1992).
Physics and Philosophy  2007  Id: 007 11
Friedel Weinert: Einstein and the Laws of Physics
Einstein was very aware that the covariance constraint involved a link of the laws
with the world of experience. In his defense against Kretschmann's objection
that covariance was physically vacuous (Kretschmann 1917) he points out that
the principle of covariance has heuristic value. It points us in the direction of
the most logically coherent theory, to the simplest system of laws. For nature
is the realization of mathematical simplicity (Einstein 1918a, p. 242; Einstein
1933, pp. 116117; Einstein 1949a, p. 68; see also the discussion of covariance
in Misner/Thorne/Wheeler 1973,  3.33.4,  12.412.5). This is of course the
expression of a metaphysical belief. Later Einstein sees more clearly the link
between covariance and objectivity. First to ensure simplicity there is the need
for covariance:
The theory of relativity arose out of eﬀorts to improve, with reference
to logical economy, the foundation of physics as it existed at the turn
of the century. The so-called special or restricted relativity theory
is based on the fact that Maxwell's equations (and thus the law of
propagation of light in empty space) are converted into equations of
the same form, when they undergo Lorentz transformation (Einstein
1940, p. 922).
This ensures that the laws continue to hold under (Lorentz) substitutions, that
they are objective statements about the external world. But form invariance is
not a suﬃcient condition to restrict the contents of the laws. The formal property
must be enhanced.
This formal property of the Maxwell equations is supplemented by
our fairly secure empirical knowledge that the laws of physics are
the same with respect to all inertial systems (Einstein 1940, p. 922;
Earman 1974, p. 272).
Here Einstein clearly refers to the empirical issue of objectivity, i.e. he links
covariant equations to symmetry invariance. The inertial frames can be subjected
to Lorentz transformations; in crossing over from K to K' the laws retain their
form; the transformations and the resulting invariances can be observed. Lorentz
invariance is testable, which indirectly conﬁrms form invariance (see Kostelecký
2004; Bluhm 2004; Kraus et al. 2002). Although the mathematical expressions
are free to change, they must change within the constraints of what the lawful
regularities in nature allow us to express. In this sense covariant equations have
empirical signiﬁcance.
3.3 Modern Considerations
Covariance is not tied to transformations between inertial frames; it is quite
general. On the modern understanding, the laws of nature can be expressed
in diﬀerent mathematical languages. We can express geometric properties in
Cartesian and polar coordinates. Modern space-time theories are expressed in
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terms of sets of geometric models of the form 〈M,Oi...On〉. We can express the
equation of motion of the geodesics in coordinate-dependent language as
d2xi
du2
= 0 , (6)
where Eq. (6) is expressed in terms of a coordinate system 〈xi〉 in ﬂat space-time.
In coordinate-free language, the equivalent equation is:
DTσTσ = 0 . (7)
where DTσ is a derivative operator or aﬃne connection and Tσ is a tangent vector
ﬁeld (Friedman 1983, pp. 389).
The modern view of covariance is (a) that laws can be expressed in diﬀerent 
coordinate-dependent and coordinate-independent  ways or (b) that covariance
can be understood generally as the equivalence of formalisms.
Ad (a) M. Friedman (Friedman 1983, pp. 5054) ﬁrst considers covariance in
coordinate-dependent formulations, which Einstein had at his disposal. Introduce





= 0 , (8)
where Φα,Θβ are objects on the manifold.
A system of equations is said to be covariant under the coordinate transformation
from 〈xi〉 to a second coordinate system 〈yj〉 just in case the same class of models
















Then he turns to a coordinate-free characterization of covariance. The coordinate
transformations are replaced by manifold transformations h4: one-one, suitably
continuous and diﬀerentiable mappings of a neighborhood of M into M . This
changes the geometrical objects from Θ to hΘ, rather than the components of
the geometrical object from Θα〈xi〉 to Θ
α
〈yj〉. Take again a system of diﬀerential
equations (8) in R4. Relative to 〈xi〉 it picks out a class of models 〈M,Φ,Θ〉. The
system of equations is said to be covariant under the manifold transformation

















4Such smooth mappings are known as diﬀeomorphisms.
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for all Φ, Θ on M (see also Norton 1989,  2.42.5).
Ad (b) E. Scheibe tries to come to grips with the notion of covariance by ﬁrst
introducing the notion of species of structures, which refers to the mathemati-
cal objects of the formalism (topological spaces, diﬀerentiable manifolds, Hilbert
spaces); secondly by introducing the concept of equivalence of species of struc-
tures, i.e. covariant versions of a theory must be equivalent to the original one.
The aim is to present covariance not as any kind of invariance but rather as a
concept of equivalence between two formulations of a physical theory that are
already invariant, one of which, however, has a higher `degree' of invariance than
the other (Scheibe 1981, p. 311; Scheibe 1991). Scheibe's notion of the equiv-
alence of theoretical expressions, which we have used above, captures Einstein's
criterion of substitution. Instead of insisting on form invariance, it also expresses
the objectivity assumption, which we associated with covariant expressions of the
laws of physics.
4 Laws of Physics
We have encountered several constraints on the laws of physics: covariance, in-
variance and relativity principles. Under Einstein's realist assumptions, the laws
of physics are at least approximate expressions of the laws of nature, if they
satisfy these constraints.
4.1 Einstein's Structure Laws
When Einstein says that the laws of physics express the lawful regularities in
nature, what exactly does he mean? Einstein does not directly address this ques-
tion. But an answer is embedded in the constraints, which Einstein imposes on
the laws. The laws of relativistic physics generally express the behavior of physical
systems. In the STR they can be represented as idealized inertial systems. A con-
sideration of the STR strongly suggests that science deals with physical systems,
not individual happenings. Science is interested in physical events represented as
the interaction of idealized systems. But physical systems are manifestations of
structure. Physical systems display structure: they consist of relata and relations,
the constituents of a system and how they are related. The relations between the
constituents are often expressed in the laws of physics. The laws play an essen-
tial part in determining the behavior of physical systems. The idealized systems
model only certain structural aspects of the natural system. For instance, the in-
ertial frames of the STR concentrate on kinematic relations. So we should expect
the laws of physics to express structural properties of physical systems. The laws
express the (invariant) relations between the constituents of the structure. In his
philosophical writings Einstein usually emphasizes the importance of a tight ﬁt
between the laws and experience: the world of experience practically determines
the theoretical system (Einstein 1918b, p. 109). He also appeals to notions like
simplicity. In the development of the theory of relativity he imposes further con-
straints on the laws of physics. They must satisfy the light postulate, relativity
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principles and the covariance principles. The constraints Einstein imposes on the
laws of physics are necessary to keep a relatively close ﬁt between the rational and
the empirical, between the symbolic expressions and what they express (Einstein
1918b, p. 109; Einstein 1919, p. 131; Einstein 1950b, p. 350; Miller 1998, Ch. 2).
In this way Einstein hopes to satisfy the objectivity criterion, which is attached
to the laws of physics.
What does ﬁt mean? Our consideration of constraints suggests that ﬁt should
be explicated in terms of constraints. A scientiﬁc model or law ﬁts its domain,
if it satisﬁes a number of constraints.5 The most obvious requirement is that the
theoretical system should be compatible with the empirical constraints. But as
the development of the theory of relativity has shown, Einstein felt compelled to
introduce further constraints, in particular, the constraints associated with the
theory of relativity. We can think of the idea of ﬁt  understood as satisfaction
of constraints  as an extension of the best matching of graphs to empirical data.
A set of data may satisfy, say, a quadratic equation. If we go beyond empirical
constraints, as the theory of relativity does, we say that a scientiﬁc theory ﬁts
an empirical domain if it satisﬁes a number of constraints. Einstein's view was
that the one theory, which best copes with all the constraints  the restrictive
conditions imposed on scientiﬁc constructs  was the theory of relativity. By
contrast, Lorentz's account of time dilation and length contraction postulates an
absolute rest frame and therefore violates the constraint of relativity. This view
will be important in our consideration of Einstein's realism (Section 5).
According to Einstein and Infeld, the equations of the theory of relativity and
electrodynamics can be characterized as structure laws (Einstein/Infeld 1938,
pp. 236245). In the authors' view structure laws apply to ﬁelds. Structure laws
express the changes which happen to electromagnetic and gravitational ﬁelds.
These structure laws are local in the sense that they exclude action-at-a-distance.
They connect events, which happen now and here with events which will hap-
pen a little later in the immediate vicinity (Einstein/Infeld 1938, p. 236). The
Maxwell equations determine mathematical correlations between events in the
electromagnetic ﬁeld; the gravitational equations express mathematical corre-
lations between events in the gravitational ﬁeld. The equations of quantum
mechanics determine the probability wave. Quantum physics deals only with
aggregates, and its laws are for crowds and not for individuals (Einstein/Infeld
1938, p. 289). Einstein submits that structure laws have the form required of all
physical laws (Einstein/Infeld 1938, p. 238, p. 243). Einstein derives his view
of structure laws from the problem situation, into which the theory of relativity
had led him. Wigner was similarly aware of the importance of structure in the
events around us,
5 This proposal assumes that the constraints are fairly robust and valid for a certain domain,
as proved to be the case in the theory of relativity. A complication arises, if the wrong
constraints are imposed, as for instance in Aristotelian views of motion in geocentric theories of
the solar system or in 19th century ether theories of electromagnetism. The wrong constraints
will either hinder or decrease the representational ﬁt of the laws and models. A suﬃcient
condition for ﬁt may well be that the constraints must be independently justiﬁable and testable
(see Weinert 2006).
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that is correlations between the events of which we take cognizance.
It is this structure, these correlations, which science wishes to discover,
or at least the precise and sharply deﬁned correlations (Wigner 1967,
p. 28).
Wigner emphasizes that the correlations between events can be mathematically
determined; it is the mathematical determination, which provides the structure
of the correlation. Generalizing the Einstein-Infeld-Wigner view we can therefore
say that structure laws express how the components (or relata) of physical systems
are mathematically related to each other. Apart from space-time events, the
relata may refer to objects like planets (as in Kepler's laws), electromagnetic
or gravitational ﬁelds or the wave function, ψ (as in the Schrödinger equation).
Einstein declares that the concepts of physics refer to a real external world, i.
e., ideas are posited of things that claim a real existence independent of the
perceiving subject (bodies, ﬁelds etc.) (Einstein 1948, p. 321, transl. Howard
1993, p. 238).
Through the insistence on constraints, imposed on scientiﬁc constructions to im-
prove their ﬁt with reality, and the views on structure laws Einstein's work hints
at a structural view of laws. His views on structure laws agree quite closely with
similar views expressed by Karl Popper.6
4.2 A Structural View of Laws
Popper's view on laws of nature was inﬂuenced by his falsiﬁcation criterion. If we
conjecture that a certain statement `a' expresses a natural law, Popper writes,
we conjecture that `a' expresses a structural property of the world;
a property which prevents the occurrence of certain logically possible
singular events (Popper 1959, p. 432).
According to Popper, natural laws express certain structural properties about the
physical world, and forbid others. The laws forbid perpetual motion machines
and superluminary velocities. Popper puts particular emphasis on the prohibitive
nature of the laws because of his concern with falsiﬁcation procedures. Theoretical
statements in science are for Popper falsiﬁable conjectures. For Popper a universal
law asserts impossibility. The converse of Popper's view is that laws not only
forbid, they also enable physical events. As Einstein put it, the laws express the
structure of physical systems, like electromagnetic and gravitational ﬁelds, as well
as probability waves. The structural aspects of natural systems, quite generally
are expressed in the laws of physics. This philosophical conception of laws is
6 This is not the only philosophical agreement between Einstein and Popper. Einstein also
agrees with Popper that inductive generalizations will not lead to the ﬁeld equations of the
theory of relativity. Theory has priority over observational data. In his Autobiographical
Notes Einstein observes about the discovery of the equations of the gravitational ﬁeld: No
ever so inclusive collection of empirical facts can ever lead to the setting up of such complicated
equations. A theory can be tested by experience, but there is no way from experience to the
setting up of a theory (Einstein 1949a, p. 89).
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interesting because it remains close to how practicing physicists like Einstein use
symbolic law expressions. A structural view of physical laws states that laws
express structural features of physical systems. They express how the relata 
the components of the system structure  are related to each other in a lawlike
manner  the relations. Physical systems do not exist isolated in the world.
They form part of larger, interrelated networks of systems and regularities. This
interrelatedness is inherent in the logic of inertial frames. The transformation
groups of the theory of relativity capture precisely what happens as we move
between inertial frames or more generally coordinate systems. This extension of
the structure from smaller to larger systems has occurred in the transition from
the STR to the GTR in several steps: ﬁrst, the structure of an inertial frame
is described; this consists of the use of rigid rods and synchronized clocks, how
their readings change as we go from unprimed to primed frames, according to
the Lorentz transformations, and how certain parameters remain invariant; later
the structure of this inertial system is embedded in larger coordinate systems,
covering both inertial and non-inertial motion. The job of science is to formulate
laws, which will express such structural features. A structural view of the laws
of physics emphasizes three points (Weinert 1993; Weinert 1995, pp. 4852).
• Laws do not refer to individual objects, or to particular properties of objects:
in Einstein's words, they connect space-time events; more generally they
connect the relata.
• Laws refer to structures. They express structural properties of physical
systems: in Einstein's words, the equations determine physical ﬁelds; more
generally, they express mathematical relations between the relata of the
systems.
• The structures of physical systems consist of relations and relata. In the
theory of relativity they are symbolized either as idealized inertial frames or
more generally as arbitrary coordinate systems. They are related through
the transformation groups. In all inertial CS the same laws are valid and
the transition from one CS to another is given by the Lorentz transforma-
tions (Einstein/Infeld 1938, p. 189; Einstein 1920, p. 150).
As Einstein emphasized, the laws of physics have important epistemological com-
ponents. Quite generally, they can be corrected and improved upon, as Einstein's
work demonstrates. More speciﬁcally, we have learned from Einstein that in or-
der to improve the ﬁt between laws of physics and laws of nature, a number of
constraints must be imposed on the symbolic expressions of laws. How do these
constraints look from the point of view of a structural view of laws?
(1) Einstein imposed his relativity principles as a ﬁrst constraint on the laws of
physics. The structure laws must describe the changes that happen to a physical
system, K, just as well as from the point of view of any system, K', that is
physically equivalent to it.
If two coordinate systems are in uniform parallel translational motion
relative to each other, the laws according to which the states of a
Physics and Philosophy  2007  Id: 007 17
Friedel Weinert: Einstein and the Laws of Physics
physical system change do not depend on which of the two systems
these changes are related to (Einstein 1905,  I.2; translated in Brown
2005, p. 74).
The operation must lead to quantitatively identical results, because the systems
are physically indistinguishable. If this does not happen we are entitled to con-
clude that our theoretical generalizations about the natural world are mistaken.
If we express the general laws on the basis of Galilean inertial frames and Eu-
clidean geometry, we may experience a misﬁt between our theories and the world,
as in the case of the rotating discs. How can this misﬁt be avoided? Einstein
demanded more general coordinate systems. The mathematical form, which the
laws of physics assume in these coordinate systems, must still express the struc-
ture of corresponding sections of an independently given physical world. The
claim is that the laws of physics will accurately represent regularities in nature if
they satisfy the constraints imposed on them. For the general coordinate systems,
Einstein demanded the satisfaction of the covariance constraint besides the other
constraints and the adoption of Riemannian geometry. If they satisfy the con-
straints, their mathematical form will reveal important structural features about
the natural world.7 For instance a quadratic equation of motion tells us that
physical systems in motion obey this form, and not others. The constraints will
increase the ﬁt between our theories and the world. The ﬁrst constraint makes
sense from a structural view of laws: it cannot be the case that the structural
relations change with respect to a change of the inertial frame. Einstein said so
himself in his 1905 paper when he complained that induced currents should not
lead to diﬀerent explanations depending on whether the conductor or the magnet
was in motion. If there are any perspectival warps, due to particular coordinate
values, they do not prevent us, as we have seen, from recovering the invariant
structural relations.
(2) The second constraint was symmetry invariance. If laws of physics express
the physical properties of natural systems, in symbolic form, and how these sys-
tems are related to each other, then symmetries express constraints on the laws.
Wigner held that there is a structure in the laws of nature, which we call the
laws of invariance (Wigner 1967, p. 29). Symmetries become structural con-
straints, for they determine the invariant parts of the structure, as inertial frames
and coordinate systems are subjected to transformations. Although there are
many forms of symmetries, here we only need attend to the geometric global
or local space-time symmetries. The space-time laws must obey the symmetry
constraints, in order to guarantee the invariances of the space-time structure.
Einstein uses this procedure to show:
(a) The Galilean transformation rules are invalid in non-classical domains, for
they give the wrong values for the measurement of c from the point of
view of two equivalent inertial systems. Consider two observers, one in
a system at rest, K, one in constant motion with respect to the ﬁrst in
frame K' who want to measure the speed of light. They need to adopt the
7 For a similar line of argument regarding causal equations, see Woodward (2003), p. 335.
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Lorentz transformations to determine that they have measured the same
value respectively.
(b) If non-inertial frames are to be regarded as equivalent to inertial ones, as the
general principle of relativity demands, this has consequences for geometry.
If the ratio of C/D in a system, K', rotating uniformly with respect to a
system at rest, K, is greater than pi from the point of view of K, we can no
longer retain Euclidean geometry for space-time (Einstein 1920, pp. 8081;
Einstein 1922, pp. 5859; Einstein 1930; Saunders 2003,  16.4).
(3) Einstein's ﬁnal constraint was covariance. In the words of Hermann Weyl,
two systems of reference are equally admissible if in both of them all univer-
sal geometric and physical laws of nature have the same algebraic expression
(quoted in Brading/Castellani 2003, p. 21). On the one hand covariance gives us
the freedom to express the laws in a number of theoretically equivalent coordinate
systems. On the other hand the covariance principle imposes a constraint on the
admissible forms of laws. Form invariance suggests that through the equivalence
of expressions the laws of physics convey structural information about the natural
world. Many equations of motion take a quadratic form. Although we can use
Eqs. (6) or (7) to express the equation of motion in space-time, both expressions
give us structural information concerning a particle's inertial motion. This struc-
tural information must be gleaned from the symbolic expressions but it resides in
what they express. It resides in their referent or propositional content. Covari-
ance in these terms is the constraint that the symbolic formulations of the laws of
physics must retain the same physical referents. It is therefore vital that equations
of motion for a restricted domain can be shown to be limiting cases of a larger do-
main, as the correspondence principle demands. This procedure is applied in the
transition from Eq. (2) to Eq. (3). It can also be shown that coordinate-dependent
formulations of laws mathematically correspond to coordinate-free formulations
(Friedman 1983, Ch. II.1). It is the sameness of reference of covariant equa-
tions, which makes them objective. In fact, as Rosenthal-Schneider noted long
ago general covariance is not a suﬃcient condition for the admissibility of an
equation as an expression of a law of nature, but combined with simplicity and
compatibility with experience it has great heuristic value (Rosenthal-Schneider
1949, p. 138, Fn. 18; cf. Norton 2003). Covariance therefore points, indirectly, to
the question of realism.
5 Einstein and Realism
Running through the discussion of Einstein and the laws of physics is the question
of Einstein's realism. It is generally agreed that Einstein's position shifted from
an early sympathy for positivism to a later commitment to realism (Holton 1965;
Fine 1986; Scheibe 1992, p. 119; but see Howard 1990; Howard 1993). But
which form of realism? Many diﬀerent versions of realism have been proposed in
philosophy (Psillos 1999; Falkenburg 2007). The discussion so far suggests that
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Einstein embraced some form of critical realism. This position simply regards
scientiﬁc theories as hypothetical constructs, free inventions of the human mind.
But there is also an external world, irrespective of human awareness. To be
scientiﬁc, theories are required to represent reality. They represent reality by
satisfying a number of empirical and theoretical constraints. The critical realist
need not claim that the theories and its laws are true mirror reﬂections of the
world and its regularities. There only needs to be the objectivity assumption that
laws of physics are good approximations and idealizations of nature's regularities.
The laws express invariant, not perspectival aspects. But if the laws are projected
into particular inertial systems, perspectival aspects of the kinematics of reference
frames result. Physical laws are symbolic, idealized representations of nature's
laws. Einstein's critical realism is to be understood in a broad sense of a synthesis
of the rational and the empirical, not in the speciﬁc sense in which this term was
used by some philosophers in the 1920s (see Hentschel 1990, Ch. 4). Nevertheless
some philosophers have recently stressed that it is more accurate to see Einstein
as a holist. For the purpose of assessing this view, it is appropriate to distinguish
two versions of holism: (a) a weaker version holds that a scientiﬁc theory is like a
coherent conceptual web and that it is not possible for empirical evidence to target
speciﬁc elements in this theory; Einstein had sympathies for this view (Howard
1990; Howard 1993). There is also a stronger version (b) according to which there
exist logically incompatible theories, which nevertheless are equally compatible
with the evidence. Such a holist attitude towards scientiﬁc theories leads to a
softer form of realism in the sense of empirical adequacy (Fine 1986; Howard 1990;
Howard 1993; Howard 2004; Lyre 2004, pp. 4955). Einstein accepts that, from a
logical point of view, arbitrarily many equivalent systems of theoretical physics
are possible. Yet, he insists that from a practical point of view, history has shown
that one system usually proves to be superior (Einstein 1918b). Einstein employs
the analogy of a crossword puzzle to make his point. The liberty of conceptual
choice, which the physicist enjoys, is that of a man engaged in solving a well
designed word puzzle. He may, it is true, propose any word as the solution; but
there is only one word which really solves the puzzle in all its forms (Einstein
1936, p. 21; Scheibe 1992, p. 130). Given Einstein's insistence on the rigidity or
coherence of physical theories, despite the freedom to invent theoretical concepts,
it is doubtful that Einstein was sympathetic to the stronger version of holism.
A problem with the holist interpretation (b) is that it neglects the importance of
constraints in Einstein's work. The presence of constraints and the concern for
ﬁt point in the direction of a stronger form of realism. Einstein is fond of the
view that theoretical constructions are not inductive generalizations from expe-
rience but free inventions of the human mind. Nevertheless there must be a ﬁt
between the theoretical expressions and the external world. This compatibility
is achieved, we suggested, through the introduction of constraints. If there is
indeed a ﬁt between what the theory says and what the material world presents,
the question of realism returns. What counterbalances the strong holist inter-
pretation of Einstein's views is Einstein's repeated insistence that out of many
rival theories there is one with the best ﬁt. Einstein did not believe that many
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alternative representations of the empirical world could be sustained. He goes
even further: he believes that there is one correct theory at any particular
moment in time. This must be the theory which best satisﬁes the constraints.
The structure of the external world has the power to eliminate many rival ac-
counts. The remaining theory could of course be underdetermined by evidence,
as the weak version of holism claims. However, the surviving theory displays
such a degree of rigidity that any modiﬁcation in it will lead to its falsehood
(Einstein 1919, p. 232; Einstein 1936; Einstein 1950b, p. 350; Hentschel 1992;
Scheibe 1992; Weinberg 1993). The idea of coherence or rigidity has implica-
tions even for the weak version of holism (Weinert 1998). It speaks against the
weak holist view that core components of scientiﬁc theories cannot be targeted
because of the general underdetermination of theories by experience. Einstein
illustrates the lack of underdetermination, from the practical perspective of the
working physicist, by the analogy of solving a crossword puzzle. In a similar way
the structure of the external world, as an empirical constraint, combined with
theoretical constraints, has the power to determine, practically, the form of the
theoretical system. In Einstein's science this process is reﬂected in the transitions
from Newtonian mechanics to the STR, and from the STR to the GTR. In these
transitions important core elements of the theories  like the transformation rules,
the addition-of-velocities theorem, and the mathematical form of physical laws 
are targeted and submitted to tests.
It was noted above, in connection with Einstein's structure laws, that physical
systems are manifestations of structure. Einstein shared the view of many physi-
cists that physics deals with systems rather than individual happenings. Given
the concern with structure in Einstein's physics  the inertial frames, the coordi-
nate systems, the invariance principles, the structure laws  it is not far-fetched to
ask to which extent Einstein's realism is compatible with some form of structural
realism. This question is independent of the current debate in philosophy about
the virtues of epistemic versus ontic structural realism, respectively. Rather the
claim is that Einstein's physics leads to a structural view of reality. Judged from
Einstein's statements it seems clear that he regarded both relata and relations as
(idealized) expressions of properties in the physical world.
The considerations in this paper suggest that a structural realist reading of phys-
ical laws is compatible with Einstein's science. According to such a structural
view of laws, the laws of physics capture structural aspects of natural systems.
That is, they symbolically express the structure of a class of natural systems
by showing how their relata are mathematically related to each other. Einstein
clearly believes in the existence of a lawlike, structured reality, a physical world
consisting of a network of systems, which can be described and explained by
physical theories. The constructs of physical theories (axioms, constraints, coor-
dinate systems, laws, models, theorems) express the structure of natural systems
in mathematical form. Einstein seems to have believed in the reality of classical
objects, ﬁelds and the structure of space-time, insofar as it is determined by the
matter-energy contents of the universe. If Einstein's science led him, philosophi-
cally, to a version of structural realism, it holds that the physical world consists
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of structures, where these structures are understood as consisting of relata and
mathematical relations. The relata are the inertial frames but also classical ob-
jects, ﬁelds and models of space-time. The relations are the structure laws but
also the symmetry principles, which come to prominence in the theory of relativ-
ity. Einstein's emphasis is on how this ontological structure can be adequately
expressed in physical theories. Despite Einstein's insistence on the rigidity of
physical theories like the STR and GTR (e.g. their coherence), it would be a
mistake to see Einstein as a naïve realist for whom theories are mirror images of
reality. This view would neglect the rationalist component in his philosophical
views. Einstein himself regarded the overcoming of naïve realism as an impor-
tant step towards the recognition that a synthesis of the rational and empirical
was the best characterization of science (Einstein 1944). As a physicist Einstein
believes in the existence of a lawful structure of the real world. As a critical
realist Einstein stresses the conjectural nature of the constructs of the real world,
which nevertheless must be adequately mapped onto the systems in the physical
world. As a (reconstructed) structural realist, Einstein holds that the rational
constructs are abstract, idealized mappings, which capture the structural ele-
ments of physical systems, like the kinematic relations between inertial reference
frames. In this sense Minkowski space-time model gives us structural knowledge
of the real world of space-time events, e.g. it gives us invariant and perspectival
aspects of these events. But any scientiﬁc model, any symbolic representation
of physical regularities is always subject to modiﬁcations. When Einstein claims
that only one correct theory survives, he means that this theory best ﬁts the
given constraints at any one time. The evolution of Einstein's thought, from the
STR to the GTR, shows that the domain of validity of a theory can get narrowed
as the constraint space enlarges.
We have associated Einstein's views on laws with his own version of structural
realism to show that his science is compatible with a stronger realist position
that goes beyond the demand for empirical adequacy. The structural realist
interpretation serves as a corrective reminder that not only Einstein's words but
also his science supports a structural version of realism.
6 Conclusion
A consideration of Einstein's physics, with its particular toolkit of geometry,
constraints and coordinate systems can be fruitfully employed in philosophical
discussions of the theory of relativity. First, constraints serve as an important
tool, quite generally, to ensure the ﬁt between symbolic representations and nat-
ural systems. Second, the constraints show how the laws of physics give rise to
a structural interpretation of the laws of nature. It makes statements about the
laws of nature via considerations of the laws of physics, rather than metaphysics.
Third, a consideration of constraints has implications for Einstein's realism. In
particular a consideration of the laws of physics and invariance principles suggests
that the theory of relativity seems to be compatible with some form of structural
realism, in the sense that it is concerned with structural aspects of the natural
22 Physics and Philosophy  2007  Id: 007
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world.8 We can agree with Reichenbach that the evolution of philosophical ideas
is guided by the evolution of physical theories (Reichenbach 1949, p. 301). In
this sense Einstein was truly a physicist-philosopher.
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